




















The interaction of various methods of mitigating economic and international 
double taxation of corporate source income is studied within a standard 
neoclassical model of firm behavior. The main purpose is to determine to what 
extent methods effective in mitigating economic double taxation in a closed 
economy remain useful in an open economy where the firm￿s marginal investor is 
a foreigner. While a cut in the statutory corporate tax rate invariably reduces the 
cost of capital, the impact of the imputation and split rate systems is shown to 
depend on whether the credit or exemption method is used in mitigating 
international double taxation, and the precise design of these methods.  
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1 Introduction 
The interaction of various methods of mitigating economic and international double taxation 
of corporate income is analyzed in order to understand how these interact in an open 
economy. The interaction is modeled by letting a domestic subsidiary distribute dividends to a 
foreign parent corporation. Of special interest is to inquire into how different methods 
effective in mitigating economic double taxation in a closed economy remain useful, in the 
meaning of affecting the cost of capital, in an open economy where the marginal investor is a 
foreigner. The analysis is carried out in a standard neoclassical model where the effects of the 
methods are evaluated based on the cost of capital.  
 
The economic double taxation (EDT) of corporate income refers to the fact that income is first 
taxed at the corporate level when it arises and then taxed a second time at the shareholder 
level when it is distributed. Most of the countries within the European Union integrate the 
corporate and shareholder taxation and a variety of methods have been employed. Some of 
them are trivial in the sense that they amount to reduce one of the nominal tax rates involved, 
i.e. the corporate tax rate or the shareholders￿ tax rates on dividends or capital gains, or 
allowing the corporations to accelerate depreciation allowances. Other methods are more 
complicated, such as the imputation system at the shareholder level, the split rate system and 
dividend deductions at the corporate level. In the EU Finland, France, Germany, Italy and the 
United Kingdom have a full or partial imputation system. A couple of countries use special 
personal tax rates on dividends, e.g. Austria, Belgium, Denmark and Greece. Sweden uses a 
method based on a tax-free allocation of a fraction of the corporate income. Outside the EU, 
the United States stays with the so-called classical system, where the corporate and 
shareholder taxes are not integrated, while Norway has an imputation system.  
 
The international double taxation (IDT) follows also from the fact that the corporate income 
is taxed twice, but this time in different countries. There are two major methods used by the 
OECD countries to treat the international double taxation; the method of tax exemption and 
the method of tax credit. Even though most tax treaties between the OECD countries are 
based on the OECD Model Convention
1 all treaties have special rules and different definitions 
                                                 
1 See e.g. ￿Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital￿ (OECD, 1996), which comments the articles in the 
Model Convention. The comments on articles 23A and 23B discuss the exemption and credit method.  2
that affect the general methods of exemption and credit. Under the tax exemption the foreign 
parent is allowed to exempt the dividends distributed from the domestic subsidiary before 
calculating its tax liability. Following countries use some form of exemption:
2 Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland.
3 According to the tax credit method, the foreign parent 
is allowed to credit the amount of tax - corporate income tax and withholding tax - already 
paid by the subsidiary in the domestic country when dividends are distributed. The amount of 
tax paid in the subsidiary is credit against the amount of tax that would have been paid by the 
parent if the income had been generated in the foreign corporation. Hence, an additional tax is 
imposed on the foreign parent if the amount of tax paid in the domestic subsidiary is to low. 
The credit may be allowed on a worldwide basis (aggregate income from all subsidiaries) or 
on a source basis (country by country or type of income). Following countries allow the parent 
corporation to use the tax credit method on a worldwide basis:
4 Iceland, Japan, the United 
States; and following on a source basis: Greece, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.  
 
Methods of mitigating EDT have been analyzed and discussed in many different contexts over 
the years under the assumption of a closed economy. This paper focuses on two of the most 
common techniques; the imputation system and the split rate system. When corporations are 
assumed to operate in an open economy the methods of mitigating IDT must also be 
considered. The interaction between the imputation and the split rate systems on one hand and 
the methods of tax exemption and tax credit on the other are analyzed. Many technical aspects 
are surrounding these methods, but I will keep them in very general terms for simplicity. The 
characteristic of each method and their interaction is nevertheless clearly illustrated.  
 
The terminology of a closed economy and an open economy in this paper falls back on if a 
domestic or foreign investor equates the non-arbitrage condition that must hold for a capital 
market in equilibrium.
5 It says, in short, that the return from investing in bonds must be equal 
to the return from investing in shares for the marginal shareholder. If the non-arbitrage 
                                                 
2 This is based on OECD (1991) and assumes a 100 percent ownership between the parent and the subsidiary 
corporation. 
3 It may also be the case that a country, e.g. Sweden, uses one of the methods in one treaty, while they use the 
other method in another treaty. 
4 According to OECD (1991).  3
condition holds for a domestic investor, i.e. the investor invests both in bonds and shares, the 
marginal shareholder is domestic and the economy is denoted closed. An economy is said to 




Boadway and Bruce (1992) argued that the methods of mitigating EDT at the shareholder 
level (personal dividend tax credit in their model) would have no effect in the open economy. 
The reason for this is that the dividend tax credit at the personal level is typical a residence 
based tax, implying that the foreign marginal shareholder is not included in the relief. The 
main point in Devereux and Freeman (1995), who extended the paper of Boadway and Bruce, 
is that the effect of introducing any method at the shareholder level in an open economy really 
depends on how the methods are designed and if the marginal shareholder is domestic or 
foreign, which they illustrate in a very simple and stylized model. I will extend the analysis of 
Devereux and Freeman by explicitly deriving a model for specific methods of mitigating EDT 
and IDT and, thereby, have the possibility to analyze what determine the cost of capital and 
how the methods interact.  
 
Following this chapter, the cost of capital and the methods of mitigating EDT are derived in 
chapter 2 under the assumption of an open economy. In chapter 3 the methods of mitigating 
IDT are introduced in the model. It contains further the analysis of the interaction between the 
methods. Chapter 4 summarizes and concludes.  
 
2 The cost of capital in an open economy 
2.1 Introduction 
The cost of capital will be derived in a general model illustrating the classical system, the 
imputation system and the split rate system. This kind of model have been derived and 
discussed in a closed economy context, among others, by King (1974), Auerbach (1983) and 
Poterba and Summers (1985) in a discrete time set up and by Bergstr￿m and S￿dersten (1981) 
in continues time. I will instead assume that the economy is open, implying that the marginal 
                                                                                                                                                         
5 The non-arbitrage condition will be formulated algebraic in chapter 2, equation (7). 
6 There is in principal nothing saying that the marginal shareholder could not be domestic in an open economy. 
However, for simplification of the terminology the term ￿open￿ is used as synonymous with foreign marginal 
shareholder and the term ￿closed￿ synonymous with domestic marginal shareholder.  4
shareholder may be foreign. This is modeled by letting a foreign corporation (the parent) do its 
business through a wholly owned domestic corporation (the subsidiary) that operates in an 
open economy. This implies that the marginal shareholder in the subsidiary automatically is 
foreign.
7 The subsidiary is performing its business under the domestic government￿s laws, tax 
code and accounting rules. In other words, the subsidiary is a ￿true￿ domestic corporation with 
a foreign owner. In deriving the subsidiary￿s cost of capital I will first set up financial and 
legal constraints that describe the subsidiary together with constraints due to the split rate and 
imputation systems. Out of the non-arbitrage condition that must hold in equilibrium for the 
parent￿s investment alternatives follows the subsidiary￿s market value, which will be 
maximized with respect to the constraints. These steps are outlined below and give the cost of 
capital under two regimes, the retention regime and the new share issue regime.
8  
 
2.2 Corporate constraints and the regimes 
The most fundamental constraint is the cash flow constraint that in principle restricts the 
amount of dividends that can be distributed;
 9   
 
  ()
f F KN D I T += + + ,       (1) 
 
where  () FK is the production function
10, I is gross investment and T is the amount of tax 
paid by the subsidiary. The amount of new share issues 
f N  is in terms of the foreign parent 
since only it can contribute with more capital, while  () F K , D, I and T are in terms of the 
domestic subsidiary. 
  
The split rate system is a method at the corporate level and, hence, it affects the cash flow 
constraint (1). According to the split rate system, see e.g. S￿dersten (1977), two different 
domestic tax rates exist on the subsidiary￿s income; 
d
dist τ  if the income is distributed to the 
                                                 
7 It does not matter for the discussion if the corporation in the domestic country is a wholly owned subsidiary or 
not. It may very well be the case that the domestic corporation has both domestic and foreign owner, but the 
important thing is that the marginal shareholder is foreign. 
8 The retention regime corresponds with the old, or traditional, view of dividend taxation and the new share issue 
regime corresponds with the new view of dividend taxation. 
9 Debts may be excluded from the model without any loss of generality. 
10 The output price is set to unity implying that the production function represents the subsidiary￿s gross earnings. 
The production function is assumed to exhibit positive but diminishing marginal product, 0 > K F  and  0 < KK F , 
which guarantees an optimal solution to the optimization problem.  5
parent and 
d τ  if the income is retained in the subsidiary. The tax rate on distributed income is 
smaller than on retained income since the purpose is to reduce the EDT. It is eliminated totally 
when  0
d
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 is the amount 
of tax the subsidiary pays on the distributed income. The amount of taxable income not 









, where δ  is 
the economic depreciation rate of the capital stock. The tax liability in the subsidiary equals 
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. The split rate system is 
modeled by substituting the expression for T into the cash flow constraint (1), which gives the 
subsidiary￿s budget constraint as; 
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.   (2) 
 
Since the imputation system is a method at the shareholder level it does not affect the cash 
flow within the subsidiary. An imputation system can be seen as the domestic government 





 for every unit of income the subsidiary distributes. If D is distributed, 
the domestic shareholders receive an amount, before personal tax, of 
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.    (3) 
 
If the shareholders are allowed to credit the whole amount of the subsidiary￿s tax, i.e. 
d φ τ = , 
the shareholders receive full credit for the amount of tax paid by the subsidiary and, hence, the 
EDT is eliminated. If φ  is less than 
d τ , the shareholders are only allowed to credit a fraction 
of the corporate tax implying a reduced, but not eliminated, double taxation.  
  6
The subsidiary belongs to one of two regimes depending on how the marginal investment is 
financed. The budget constraint (2) can be rewritten as 
f I RE N =+ , where RE  is the 
retained earnings in the subsidiary.
11 Hence, the subsidiary has two sources of financing at the 
margin; retained earnings or new share issues. I will put a restriction on the amount of income 
distributed in order to illustrate the two different regimes. Following Auerbach (1984) the 
corporations must distribute dividends and, at least, meet a minimum dividend payout ratio;  
 
() () () 1
d
dist D fF K K τδ ≥− − .    (4)   
 
The constraint says that the dividends may not fall below a fraction  f  of the after-tax income. 
The two different regimes are distinguished depending on how the marginal investment is 
financed. In the retention regime, the dividends are greater than the dividend floor in (4). The 
subsidiary has the possibility to reduce the dividends, i.e. increase RE, and still meet the 
minimum payout ratio, implying that the marginal investment is financed with retained 
earnings. In contrast, the marginal investment is financed with new share issues in the new 
share issue regime where the dividend constraint (4) is binding. This is because the amount of 
retained earnings is exhausted and becomes fixed. According to 
fix f I RE N =+, the marginal 
investment must be financed with new share issues.  
 
The subsidiary is only allowed to distribute income to the parent through dividends. The 
parent is particularly not allowed to repurchase its own shares, modeled as; 
 
  0
f N ≥ .         ( 5 )  
 
Further, the subsidiary is not allowed to accelerate the depreciation of the capital stock. This 
implies that the capital stock and the book capital stock are equal in the model. As a result, it 
is only one equation of motion, which shows how the capital stock changes over time due to 
investments and economic depreciation; 
 
  K IK δ =−  .       ( 6 )  
                                                 







REF K K D ττ δ
τ
 
=− + −   −  
.  7
 
2.3 The cost of capital 
A capital market is in equilibrium when the marginal investor is indifferent between an 
investment in bonds at the rate i, with the return given on the left hand side, and shares, with 
the return given on the right hand side of the non-arbitrage condition; 
 











 .   (7) 
 
The marginal shareholder is assumed to be the foreign parent corporation and not the 
shareholders of the parent, see e.g. Sinn (1993). In (7), 
0 t V  is the value of the subsidiary, 
0 t V   is 





 is the actual amount of dividends that would have reached 
domestic shareholders under the imputation system according to (3); all at time  0 t . But the 
marginal investor is a foreigner and the parameter κ  captures the effect of different methods 
of mitigating IDT and how these methods are designed.
12 Since the foreign parent is the only 
owner of the subsidiary the marginal shareholder is automatically foreign, implying that the 
tax rates in the non-arbitrage condition (7) belongs to the foreign parent. 
f τ  and 
f
c τ  are the 
foreign corporate tax rates on interest income and capital gains, respectively.  
 


























 .     (8) 
 
t V  equals the present value of the net cash flow to the parent, i.e. adjusted dividends minus the 
capital contribution through new share issues. The problem of maximizing the market value of 
                                                 
12 When no method is employed for mitigating IDT the parameter becomes  1
f κτ =− , which is the most common 
interpretation in the literature. This implies that the parent receives () () 11
f D τ φ −−  when the subsidiary 
distributes  D  and the domestic government adds  () 1 φφ −  according to the imputation system. Note that the split 
rate system is incorporated in  D  through the budget constraint (2).  8
the subsidiary given in (8) under the constraints (2), (4), (5) and (6) is formalized as (index t 
is omitted);  
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  () () () 1.
df
Dd i s t N K D fF K K N I K K ητδ η µ δ    +− − −++− −   
  
 
Assuming a steady state solution, the necessary and sufficient first order conditions with 
respect to I, 
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The cost of capital is the lowest acceptable rate of return on a new investment and is equated 
to the first derivative of the production function with respect to the capital stock,  () K FK . The 
cost of capital net of economic depreciation, i.e.  () K FK ρ δ =− , in the retention regime (RR) 
and the new share issue regime (NSIR) become; 
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and 
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−− − + −
−
.   (10) 
 
From (9) it is clear that neither the imputation nor the split rate system affect the cost of 
capital in the retention regime. This is explained by the fact that any additional cash flow 
generated by the marginal investment in the subsidiary is distributed to the parent. It cannot be 
used to reduce the amount of the new share issues since it already equals zero.  Hence, the less 
expensive source of financing is already used, which implies that the cost of capital is 
unaffected. One can also conclude that the methods of mitigating IDT, captured by κ , have 
no effect on the cost of capital in the domestic subsidiary. The intuition of this finding follows 
also from the fact that the subsidiary already uses the less expensive source of financing. The 
cost of capital is unaffected to whom, domestic or foreign, the dividends are distributed.  
 
A first comparison of the costs in the two regimes, (9) and (10) makes it clear that the cost is 
not the same in all corporations. It depends on how the marginal investment is financed. A 
more comprehensive comparison is postponed to chapter 3 where κ  is defined. A further 
result concerns the effect of the domestic corporate tax rate, 
d τ , in a small open economy. 
Apprehension has been raised that the domestic corporate tax rate plays no role in determining 
the cost of capital in a domestic corporation (the subsidiary) when the marginal shareholder is 
foreign (the parent). But, as shown in (9) and (10), this apprehension is wrong. The domestic 
corporate tax rate does affect the cost in both the retention and the new share issue regime in 
open economies. Moreover, the result holds independent of which method that is used for 
mitigating IDT and how it is designed. 
 
3 The interaction between methods of mitigating EDT and IDT 
3.1 Introduction 
I next focus on the methods of mitigating IDT; tax credit and tax exemption. The parameter κ  
will take different values depending on which method that is used and how it is designed.  10
According to the non-arbitrage condition (7) the amount of dividends the foreign parent 









.      ( 1 1 )  
 
When no method is employed for mitigating IDT the amount of dividends distributed from the 
subsidiary to the parent will be taxed at the foreign corporate tax rate, implying that 
1
f κτ =− . After deriving κ  for the different methods follows the analysis of how the 
methods of mitigating EDT remains useful in an open economy. Out of the analysis follows 
also what factors that determine the cost of capital.  
 
3.2 The methods for mitigating international double taxation 
i) Tax Credit 
Under the tax credit method the parent is offered a credit for the amount of tax already paid by 
the subsidiary. Assume for the moment that the domestic corporate tax rate is 
d
eff τ . This is just 
to illustrate how the method of tax credit works; the factor 
d
eff τ  will be defined below. From 
the perspective of the parent corporation the amount of income generated in the subsidiary 













14 The tax liability would be 
f τ ψ  if the income were 
generated in the foreign country. The parent then credits the domestic tax that has been paid 
by the subsidiary, which equals 
d
eff τ ψ . The net tax paid by the foreign parent then equals 
()
fd



























      ( 1 2 )    
                                                 
14 Remember from the non-arbitrage condition (7) that the foreign parent values the subsidiary based on an 
amount of dividends equal to  () 1 D φ − . So, from the parent￿s perspective the amount of income before domestic 
tax is ψ  as in the main text, even though the actual income in the subsidiary before domestic tax is  () 1
d
eff D τ − .  11
 
in the tax credit method according to (11).
16 The interesting parameter in (12) is the domestic 
effective corporate tax rate 
d
eff τ . It takes different values depending on how the method of tax 
credit is designed. Two different scenarios may appear. 
 
In scenario 1 the foreign government takes into account that 
d
eff τ  is lower than the nominal 
d τ when any method is employed for mitigating EDT. This is modeled in various papers by 
using an average domestic corporate tax rate.
17 I will instead calculate an effective corporate 
tax rate. Note that the effective rate also considers other differences, besides the methods of 














. The domestic 
effective corporate tax rate can then be solved as;
18 
 









.      ( 1 3 )  
 
















.      ( 1 4 )  
                                                                                                                                                          
15  () () 1
ff d
eff DD φ ττ ψ =− − −  
16 There is no withholding tax in the model for simplification of the expressions. Adding the withholding tax 
implies that  () ( ) 11
f d withholding
eff κτ τ τ =− − + . The general conclusions outlined are the same.  
17 Keen (1990), OECD (1991) and Hines (1994) are examples of where the average domestic corporate tax rate 
approach is used and discussed. The average tax rate is basically calculated as the ratio of the amount of tax paid 
by the subsidiary in the domestic country over the subsidiary￿s taxable income from the foreign parent￿s 
perspective. 
18  () ()() 11 1
dd
dist eff DD ττ φ −− = −  
19 If this expression is substituted into the non-arbitrage condition (7) the imputation parameter φ  cancels and the 
amount of dividends  D  is scaled by () ( ) 11
fd
dist ττ −−, which is less than unity under the tax credit method and 
thereby correcting for the split rate system. Hence, the value of dividends is reduced when the foreign 
government controls for the methods of mitigating EDT in the domestic country.   12
 
As an alternative, scenario 2, the domestic effective tax rate is set equal to the nominal rate, 
i.e. 
dd
eff ττ = . This implies that the foreign government ignores the fact that the domestic 
effective corporate tax rate is different from the nominal due to the methods of mitigating 













.       ( 1 5 )  
 
 
ii) Tax Exemption 
In the second method of mitigating IDT, the method of tax exemption, dividends distributed 
from the subsidiary to the parent are exempted from tax as long as the corporate income is 




 is the amount of dividends after domestic corporate tax, 







 and, hence,  1 κ =  
according to (11). 
 
3.3 The interaction between the different methods 
All components for evaluating the cost of capital under different methods have now been 
derived. Since the cost is unaffected of any method of mitigating IDT in the retention regime 
focus is now solely on the new share issue regime. Hence, the benchmark equation from 
which the cost of capital in the different cases can be derived is expression (10), which is 
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−      
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The cost of capital equals the after tax return on the alternative investment grossed up by two 
parts. The fraction () 1 f −  of the income is retained in the subsidiary and therefore taxed at  13
the domestic tax rate and the foreign tax rate on capital gains. The fraction  f  of the income is 
distributed to the parent and the cost is, for that reason, affected by the methods of mitigating 
EDT and IDT. Since the methods only affect the fraction of the income that is distributed it is 
more convenient just to analyze this part. 
 
Table 1: The f-part in the new share issue regime 
  I   II  III   IV 
 No  method 
1
f κτ =−  



























 Tax  exemption 
1 κ =  
The classical system 
0
dd
dist ,  ττ φ ==   () () 11
f d ττ −−   <  () 1
f τ −   = () 1
f τ −   ?  () 1
d τ −  
The imputation system 
0
dd
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The split rate system 
0
dd
dist ,  ττ φ <=  




<  () 1














  ?  () 1
d
dist τ −  
Note: A higher  f -part implies a lower cost of capital. 
 
Column I in table 1 illustrates the different systems when no method is employed for 
mitigating IDT. As is clear from the classical system the  f -part is taxed fully both by the 
foreign and the domestic country. This is to be compared to the cases where the imputation 
and split rate systems are employed, where the amount of domestic tax paid on the income is 
reduced, either by φ  or 
d
dist τ , respectively. The  f -part increases and, as a result, the cost of 
capital decreases. Hence, under full IDT the effective methods in mitigating EDT in a closed 
economy remain useful in an open economy. The cost of capital is reduced under the 
imputation and split rate systems. 
 
The  f -parts under the method of tax credit are in column II and III in table 1. When the 
foreign government corrects for the fact that the domestic effective corporate tax rate is lower 
than the nominal (scenario 1), the f -parts equal () 1
f τ −  under all systems. This is seen in 
column II. The domestic tax rate or any share of it does not show up implying that the IDT is 
effectively eliminated. But, correcting for a lower effective domestic corporate tax rate makes,  14
of course, the methods of mitigating EDT ineffective. Some interesting special cases arise 
when the domestic country has employed an imputation system or a split rate system totally. 
When the split rate system is used to its maximum,  0
d
dist τ = , it does not matter if no method or 
the tax credit method (scenario 1) are employed for mitigating IDT. The cost of capital is the 
same in both cases. The result reappears in the case the imputation rate parameter equals the 
domestic corporate tax rate, i.e. 
d φ τ = .  
 
In column III of table 1 the foreign government ignores the fact that 
d
eff τ  may be lower and 
uses instead 
d τ  when calculating the amount of tax credit (scenario 2). Compared to column 
II, the imputation and the split rate systems remain useful when the tax credit method is 
employed. This implies that both the methods of mitigating EDT and IDT affect the cost. As a 
result the costs of capital become lower compared to the tax credit (scenario 1) and to the case 
when no method is employed. The income from the subsidiary becomes untaxed when the 
split rate system is used totally if the domestic and foreign tax rates are equal, 
df ττ = . The 
result reappears under the imputation system in the case 
df φ ττ == . 
 
As is clear from column IV the  f -parts and, hence, the costs of capital are independent of the 
foreign tax rate when the method of tax exemption is employed. This is because dividends are 
tax exempted. Compared to column I where no method is employed, the  f -parts have 
become  () 11
f τ −  times larger. In the nature of the tax exemption method lies that the 
foreign government accepts both the domestic tax rate and the different methods employed for 
mitigating EDT. As a consequence, both the imputation and the split rate systems remain 
useful. Further, as long as 
df ττ <  the tax exemption gives the highest measure of the  f -part, 
implying the lowest cost of capital.  
 
So far the imputation and the split rate systems have been assumed to cover both domestic and 
foreign shareholders. However, it is possible to design any method at the shareholder level to 
only cover domestic shareholder. If the imputation system only covers domestic shareholders, 
the foreign parent does not benefit from the method. Under the methods of tax credit and 
exemption the imputation parameter φ  is set to zero, implying an increased cost of capital.  15
The distinction between different owner is not possible to do when a method at the corporate 
level is employed, like the split rate system. 
  
3.4 A comparison of the cost of capital in the two regimes 
Given the methods of mitigating EDT and IDT it is possible to compare the cost of capital in 
the retention and new share issue regime. This is done by rewriting the cost in the new share 
issue regime (10) in terms of counterpart in the retention regime (9). The relationship 
becomes; 
() ()
















 −− − + −  − 
 (16) 
 
By comparing the nominator and the denominator in (16) it is possible to set up constraints on 
the parameter to give a specific relation between the costs of capital. Table 2 shows the 
constraints for the cost of capital to be higher in the new share issue regime. 
 
Table 2: Restrictions on the parameters for the cost of capital to be higher in the NSIR 
 I  II  III  IV 
 No  method 
1
f κτ =−  




























1 κ =  
The classical system 
0
dd
dist ,  ττ φ ==  
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  Not possible 
The imputation system 
0
dd

























  Not possible  Not possible 
The split rate system 
0
dd


























  Not possible  Not possible 
 
The standard result in a closed economy model of a higher cost of capital in the new share 
issue regime under the classical system reappears in this context only as a special case as is 
clear from table 2. This is when no method is employed for mitigating IDT, see column I. In 
all other cases the parameter values are quite restrictive
20 for implying a higher cost of capital 
                                                 
20 A domestic corporate tax rate less than 21 percent when  35
f . τ =  and  5
ff
c . ττ =  as an example.  16
in the new share issue regime, and not possible in 5 cases. The conclusion from this 
comparison is that, given that any method is employed for mitigating EDT, the cost of capital 
is most likely higher in the retention regime compared to the new share issue regime. Hence, 
the effect of mitigating EDT and IDT more than offset the fact that the subsidiary in the 
retention regime uses initial the less expensive source of finance at the margin. 
 
3.5 The effect on the market value 
Under the new share issue regime the market value for a subsidiary is reported in (8). The 
amount of new share issues 
f N  is positive implying that it is not possible to draw any 
conclusions of how the market value changes due to the methods of mitigating EDT and IDT. 
But, for a subsidiary in the retention regime the effect can be analyzed. This is because the 
amount of new share issues equals zero at the margin, implying that the market value in (8) 




































 in (17) represents the capitalization effect that arises in the retention 
regime when different methods are employed for mitigating EDT and IDT. The effects are 
summarized in table 3.  
 
Table 3: The capitalization effect in the retention regime 
 I  II  III IV 
 No  method 
1
f κτ =−  
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From table 3 it is clear, by comparing column I with the rest, that the market value of the 
subsidiary increases when a method is put to use for mitigating IDT. Remember from (9) that 
the methods of mitigating EDT or IDT have no effect on the cost of capital. Any attempt to 
increase the investment volume by decreasing the cost of capital fails when the subsidiary 
finances the marginal investment with retained earnings. The result is instead an increased 
market value.  
 
Given a specific method of mitigating IDT the capitalization effect will depend on how the 
method is designed. Column I in table 3 illustrates that the methods of mitigating EDT is 
capitalized in the market value when the income is taxed fully international. The capitalization 
effect implies that the market value increases under the imputation and split rate systems, 
compared to the classical system. The result reappears in the tax credit method when the 
domestic government ignores to adjust for a lower domestic effective tax rate (scenario 2), see 
column III.  
 
A quite surprising result appears under the method of tax credit (scenario 1) where the foreign 
government uses the effective tax rate when calculating the amount to credit. The imputation 
and the split rate systems are not capitalized in the market value as is clear from column II. At 
the same time the cost of capital is unaffected since the subsidiary finances the marginal 
investment with retained earnings. Depending on the relative magnitude of the parameters the 
same conclusions appear under the method of tax exemption as well, see column IV. The 




The distribution of the tax liability between the subsidiary and the parent depends on which 
method that is employed for mitigating EDT under the tax credit.
21 Following the derivations 










=   − 
. The effective corporate tax rate 
d
eff τ  takes different values depending on 
how the tax credit is designed and which method that is used for mitigating EDT, but 
dd
eff ττ <   18
always holds. The effect of a positive change in 
d
eff τ  on the amount of tax paid by the foreign 
parent is negative. Hence, a reduced 
d
eff τ  implies that the tax liability in the foreign parent 
rises while it is reduced in the subsidiary. The tax liability is in some way exported from the 
domestic subsidiary to the foreign parent. In summary, the amount of tax paid increases in the 
foreign country and decreases in the domestic country, while the cost of capital in, and the 
market value of, the subsidiary in the domestic country are unchanged. 
 
4 Summary and conclusions 
In determining the cost of capital in a domestic corporation (the subsidiary) with a foreign 
marginal shareholder (the parent) several factors must be considered. The source of finance at 
the margin plays a crucial role. It is shown that for a corporation that finances the marginal 
investment with retained earnings the cost of capital is unaffected both of methods of 
mitigating EDT and IDT. This is fully explained by the fact that the cost of capital is 
unaffected of any factors affecting the amount of distributed dividends. The effect is instead 
an exported tax liability or capitalization of the market value. Hence, there is no meaning 
using any method of mitigating neither EDT nor IDT if the motive is to mitigate the double 
taxation. On the other hand, as long as the corporation finances the marginal investment with 
new share issues the methods of mitigating EDT and IDT do affect the cost of capital. The 
outcome depends on which method that is used and how they are designed.  
 
Besides the domestic corporate tax rate two methods of mitigating EDT are analyzed; the 
imputation and the split rate systems. The effect on the cost of capital depends on which 
method that is used for mitigating IDT. Under the method of tax exemption both the 
imputation and the split rate systems remains useful, in the meaning of affecting the cost of 
capital in an open economy. This is also the case under the method of tax credit as long as the 
foreign government does not adjust the amount of tax to credit. But, if the foreign government 
adjusts the amount the methods no longer affect the cost of capital. The cost is lowest under 
the tax exemption, given that the foreign corporate tax rate is larger than the domestic 
counterpart. It is further shown that the cost of capital is higher in the retention regime than in 
the new share issue regime as long as any method is used for mitigating the EDT totally.  
                                                                                                                                                          
21 Since the foreign parent do not pay any tax on dividends under tax exemption it is only interesting to focus on  19
 
Even though the marginal shareholder is foreign the domestic corporate tax rate will always 
affect the cost of capital in a domestic corporation in an open economy. It does not matter if 
the corporate income is taxed twice at the corporate level or if any method is employed for 
mitigating IDT. Further, the source of financing the marginal investment does not matter.  
                                                                                                                                                          
the method of tax credit.  20
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Appendix: Derivation of the cost of capital 
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The first order conditions: 
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The retention regime (RR)  
Under the retention regime is  () () () 1
d
dist D fF K K τδ >− −  and  0
f N =  implying that the 
shadow values become η D = 0 and  0 > N η . This gives following first order conditions: 
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The net cost of capital is then given from I’  and K’  as: 
 
















    (9) 
 
 
The new share issue regime (NSIR) 
Under the new share issue regime is  () () () 1
d
dist D fF K K τδ =− −  and  0
f N >  implying that 
the shadow values become  0 > D η  and  0 = N η . This implies that the first order condition can 
be rewritten as; 
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The net cost of capital is then given from 
f’ N , I’ , D’  and K’  as: 
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